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Doyle v. Ortega: Is Specific Performance Available 
for Buyers in an Earnest Money Contract?* 
In a recent Idaho Supreme Court opinion, the buyers in an earnest 
money contract were denied the remedy of specific performance. 1 
Although the stare decisis impact of this case is limited to the State of 
Idaho, the topic is worthy of discussion for three reasons. First, this 
decision has a broad effect on people, as most people enter into an 
earnest money contract when they are purchasing a home. Second, both 
contract and real estate law are areas traditionally reserved for the states. 
Thus, a ruling from the highest state court is the final word on the law. 
Finally, the opinion in Dayle v. Onega lacks sufficient legal analysis and 
authority to support the holding. Bringing the court's errors to light 
could help reverse a similar holding in a future case and help other 
jurisdictions avoid the same pit-falls. 
Part I of this note gives the background of Dayle v. Onega. Part II 
reviews the court's analysis of the case. Part III examines the court's 
decision under general rules of contract law not considered by the Dayle 
court. Part IV concludes that the court erred by not granting the buyers 
specific performance. 
I. BACKGROUND 
Dayle v. Onega considers a real estate contract between the seller, 
Tom Ortega, and the buyers, Patrick Doyle and Laurie Rowlett-Doyle. 
The case presents the court with two main issues: first, whether the 
parties had entered into a contract; and second, if there was a contract, 
whether the default clause precluded the buyers from obtaining the 
remedy of specific performance when the seller failed to consummate the 
sale. 2 
* Copyright <D 1995 Robert L. Phillips. The author takes sole responsibility for the 
opinions and any analytical deficiencies in this note. However, I would like to thank the 
members of Hopkins, Roden, Crockett, Hansen & Hoopes for their inspiration. Their concern 
for and participation in the Idallo Falls, Idallo community was a great example for me. Thanks 
for teaching me that there is more to being an attorney than simply practicing law. Their 
genuine concern for people, their community, and their profession will influence my entire 
legal career. The firm's Friday morning meetings may not solve all the world's problems, but 
it is a good start. I would also like to thank Michelle, Elizabeth, Joshua, and Nathan for their 
unselfish love and support. 
I. Doyle v. Ortega, 872 P.2d 721,724 (ldallo 1994). 
2. See id. 
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Tom Ortega listed real property that he owned with a broker for 
$32,000. 3 "Patrick Doyle and Laurie Rowlett-Doyle (the Doyles) visited 
[this listed] property and decided to purchase it. "4 The Doyles offered 
$28,000 for the property by submitting an earnest money agreement, 
which explained the terms of their proposal. 5 Ortega rejected this offer 
and counter-offered to sell the property for $30,000 if the Doyles would 
modify four terms in their initial offer. 6 First, the down payment at 
closing had to be increased to $6,000.7 Second, monthly payments had 
to be increased to $231.61. 8 Third, the Doyles would pay all the long-
term escrow fees and the closing agent's fees. 9 Finally, the earnest 
money had to be deposited with a Rock Springs, Wyoming bank. 10 
Ortega's realtor prepared a new earnest money agreement. 
However, the realtor forgot to incorporate all of the changes discussed 
with Ortega before sending a copy of the new earnest money agreement 
to the Doyles. 11 Upon receipt of the new earnest money agreement, the 
Doyles signed it and returned it to their realtor. 12 
Before sending a copy of the new earnest money agreement to 
Ortega, Ortega's realtor realized that the wrong boxes had been marked, 
indicating that Ortega, not the Doyles, would be responsible for the 
closing costs. 13 Ortega's realtor corrected Ortega's copy of the new 
3. ld. at 722. 
4. ld. 
5. I d. The earnest money agreement was composed of a fonn real estate purchase and 
sale agreement and receipt for earnest money dated March 11, 1991. See Real Estate Purchase 
& Sale Agreement & Receipt for Earnest Money, RE-21 , prepared by Ada County Association 
of REAL TORS (Rev. 1-90) [hereinafter Doyles' Earnest Money Contract] (copy of the actual 
contract between the Doyles and Ortega, on file with the author); cj, e.g., Real Estate 
Purchase & Sales Agreement& Receipt for Earnest Money, RE-21,prepared by Ada County 
Association of REALTORS (Rev. 9-92) (the 1992 version of the earnest money prepared by 
the same organization that prepared the form used by the Doyles and Ortega contract); Real 
Estate Purchase and Sales Agreement (with Earnest Money Provision), RE-21 (Rev. 4-83) 
(example of another version of an earnest money contract by an unidentified drafter). The 
offer for $28,000 consisted of $5,600 down, then monthly payments of principal and interest 
for five years at $216.19, and the balance would be due in a balloon payment at the end of the 
five years. Doyle, 872 P.2d at 722. 
6. Doyle, 872 P.2d at 722. Ortega's counteroffer is a new offer, which acted as a 
rejection of the Doyles' previous offer. See REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 39 
(1979). 
7. Doyle, 872 P.2d at 722. 
8. ld. 




13. I d. It is important to note that Ortega's realtor "marked the wrong boxes." ld. As 
with most earnest money contracts, these are standardized forms with boilerplate language 
which is usually not negotiated. The items usually negotiated are the price, the payment plan, 
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earnest money agreement to reflect that the Doyles would be responsible 
for closing costs as agreed. Ortega eventually signed this copy. 14 
The Doyles' realtor learned of the revisions and called Patrick Doyle, 
who orally agreed to all of Ortega's revisions that were not contained in 
their copy of the new earnest money agreement. 15 The Doyles' realtor 
also "prepared an addendum to the new earnest money agreement in an 
effort to incorporate all of the revisions. "16 
Patrick Doyle returned the signed addendum to his realtor. 
However, "Ortega never signed his copy of the addendum. "17 When 
the Doyles' demanded that Ortega consummate the sale, he refused. 18 
The Doyles brought a suit for specific performance, claiming that 
damages would not be sufficient since the property was unique.19 
Ortega countered that he had never entered into a contract. 20 Alterna-
tively, if there was a contract, he claimed that the default clause in the 
new earnest money contract "made it clear that the Doyles' only remedy 
was the return of their earnest money and reimbursement fur their 
costs. "21 Ortega based this argument on the default clause on the 
reverse side of the earnest money contract. 22 The default clause 
provided that the seller was entitled to retain the earnest money if the 
buyer breached, but retention of the earnest money did not waive other 
rights and remedies. 23 In contrast, if the seller breached, the default 
the financing, and which party is responsible for the various closing and administrative costs. 
See Doyles' Earnest Money Contract, supra note 5. 
14. Doyle, 872 P.2d 722. 
15. ld. 
16. ld. Additionally, the addendum extended the closing date but omitted the 
requirement that the earnest money be transferred to the Rock Springs National Bank. The 
closing date was extended because "Ortega did not obtain the requisite septic tank approval 
from the health department until May 8, 1991. . . . The addendum omitted the requirement 
that the earnest money be transferred to Rock Springs because the realtor concluded that Idaho 
law required that the earnest money be held in trust in Idaho." /d. at 722-23. 






23. See id. The default clause afforded the following remedies for the seller: 
S. Default: If Seller executes this agreement, and title to the subject property is 
marketable and insurable and the Buyer fails, neglects or refuses to comply with the 
terms of any conditions of sale set forth herein within five (5) days from the date on 
which said term or condition is to be complied with, then the earnest money, upon 
written request of the Seller shall be forfeited and the Buyer's interest in the property, 
if any, shall be terminated. The holder of the earnest money as designated herein 
shall pay from the earnest money forfeited by the Buyer the cost of title insurance, 
escrow fees, attorney's fees and any other expenses directly incurred by or on behalf 
of the Buyer and Seller in connection with this transaction and the remainder shall be 
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clause required the seller to return the buyer's earnest money. 24 The 
clause was silent as to whether other rights and remedies were reserved 
or waived. 25 Ortega essentially claimed that this silence taken with the 
seller's expressed reservation of rights constituted the buyers' waiver of 
other remedies. 
After reviewing these clauses, the trial court concluded that there was 
insufficient evidence to prove that the liquidated damages were meant to 
be the exclusive remedy. 26 Therefore, the trial court granted a partial 
summary judgment to the Doyles for specific performance. 27 At trial, 
"the trial court also found that the parties had reached a meeting of the 
minds about all the essential terms of the sale and purchase of the 
property and had intended to be contractually bound. "28 The trial court 
granted the buyers specific performance, but the supreme court reversed 
that ruling. 29 
II. THE IDAHO SUPREME Comrr's ANALYSIS 
In deciding whether the buyers were entitled to specific performance, 
the court faced two issues. First, was there a contract between the seller 
and the buyers?30 If a contract did not exist, other issues, including 
specific performance, were moot. Second, what remedies were the 
buyers entitled to if the seller breached the contract? Specifically, were 
the buyers entitled to specific performance under this particular earnest 
money agreement?31 
apportioned one-half to the Seller and one-half to the Broker. holding the earnest 
money, provided the amount to the Broker does not exceed the agreed commission. 
The payment by Broker as aforesaid shall not constitute a waiver of any other rights 
or remedies available to the Seller and/or Broker. Buyer shall be responsible for any 
and all costs or fees incurred by or on behalf of the Buyer. 
/d. (emphasis added). 
24. /d. If the seller breached the contract, the contract provided the following remedies 
for the buyer: 
/d. 
If the Seller, having approved said sale fails to consummate the same as herein 
agreed, the Earnest Money shall be returned to the Buyer less such charges and other 
costs or fees incurred or committed for use by or on behalf of the Buyer hereunder 
and Seller shall pay for the cost of title insurance, escrow and legal fees, if any, and 
reimburse Buyer for that portion of the Earnest Money expended or committed on 






30. /d. at 723-24. 
31. /d. at 724. 
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A. The Court's Analysis of Whether a Contract Existed 
The supreme court's analysis of whether a contract existed was very 
brief. To reverse the trial court's decision, the seller, Ortega, had to 
establish that the trial court's decision was not supported by substantial 
evidence or, in other words, was "clearly erroneous. "32 This standard 
of review required Ortega to show that there was no "substantial and 
competent evidence to support the trial court's findings. "33 
After reviewing the facts, the supreme court held that there was 
substantial and competent evidence to support the trial court's findings. 34 
Only the contract term requiring the earnest money to be placed with a 
bank in Rock Springs was at issue because the money had never been 
placed there. 35 However, the court held that placing the earnest money 
in a particular bank in Rock Springs was inconsequential in deciding 
whether the parties had a meeting of the minds.36 
B. The Court's Analysis of Specific Performance 
Before addressing the issue of specific performance, the court 
addressed its standard of review for contracts. The standard of review 
was contingent upon whether the contract was ambiguous. 37 If the 
contract was held ambiguous, its interpretation would be a question of 
fact. If the contract was not ambiguous, its interpretation would be a 
question of law over which the court could exercise free review. 38 The 




36. /d. A violation of the statute of frauds was the only other argument questioning 
whether there was a contract between Ortega and the Doyles. This issue arose because land 
transfers of real property must be in writing, and Patrick Doyle at one point orally agreed to 
the changes of Ortega. Compare id. at 722 with IDAHO CoDE § 9-503 ( 1990) (discussion and 
law regarding the Statute of Frauds). However, neither the trial court nor the supreme court 
allowed this argument since Ortega did not bring the issue up in his pleadings. Doyle, 872 
P.2d at 724. Under the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, if the statue of frauds is not raised as 
an affirmative defense, it is waived. See id at 724 (citing IDAHO R. CIV. P. 8(c) (1994)). 
37. If the contract is ambiguous, the question of the parties' intent is a factual question 
where deference is given to the trial court, see Doyle, 872 P.2d at 724, and the standard of 
review is clearly erroneous. IDAHO R. CIV. P. 52( a) (1994). If the contract is not ambiguous, 
the court can interpret the contract as a matter of law. 
38. See Doyle, 872P.2dat724 (quotingBondyv. Levy, 829P.2d 1342, 1345-46(1daho 
1992)) (stating that free review is the same standard as de novo review); see also Robert M. 
Tyler, Jr., Practices and StrategiesjoraSuccessjulAppeal, 16AM. J. TRlALADVOC. 617,618 
(1993). 
According to the court, the rules regarding the review of contracts were well established: 
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supreme court held that the default clause in the earnest money contract 
was not ambiguous. 39 The court then, using the standard of free 
review, reversed the trial court's holding and concluded that the default 
clause limited the buyer to the remedy stated in the contract. 40 This 
conclusion was based on two factors. First, the court compared the 
seller's default clause to the buyers'. The seller's default clause provided 
for retention of the earnest money by the seller and broker upon the 
buyers' default and did not waive "any other rights or remedies 
available. "41 Conversely, the buyers' default clause made no such 
reservation, so the court concluded that other remedies were precluded 
and the buyers were limited to the return of their earnest money. 42 
Second, the supreme court held that returning the earnest money was 
"inconsistent with specific performance." However, the court never 
explained this inconsistency. 43 Apparently, these remedies are inconsis-
tent because returning the earnest money means canceling the deal while 
specific performance means consummating it. This or some other 
difference not expressed persuaded the court that allowing both remedies 
would unjustly enrich the buyers. 
The court supported its denial of specific performance with Margaret 
H. Wayne Trust v. Lipsky.44 In Lipsky the contract contained a liquidat-
The primary objective in construing a contract is to discover the intent of the parties, 
and in order to effectuate this objective, the contract must be viewed as a whole and 
considered in its entirety. The primary consideration in interpreting an ambiguous 
contract is to determine the intent of the parties. The determination ofthe contract's 
meaning and legal effect are questions of law to be decided by the court where the 
contract is clear and unambiguous. However, where the Contract is determined to 
be ambiguous, the interpretation of the document presents a question of fact which 
focuses upon the intent of the parties. The determination of whether a contract is 
ambiguous or not is a question of law over which we may exercise free review, and 
in determining whether a contract is ambiguous, our task is to ascertain whether the 
contract is reasonably subject to conflicting interpretation. 
Doyle, 872 P.2d at 724. (quoting Bond v. Levy, 829 P.2d 1342, 1344-46 (Idaho 1992)). 
39. Doyle, 872 P.2d at 724. 
40. ld. at 725. The buyers' remedy under the default clause is as follows: 
If the Seller, having approved said sale fails to consummate the same as herein 
agreed, the Earnest Money shall be returned to the Buyer less such charges and other 
costs or fees incurred or committed for use by or on behalf of the Buyer hereunder 
and Seller shall pay for the cost of title insurance, escrow and legal fees, if any, and 
reimburse Buyer for that portion of the Earnest Money expended or committed on 
behalf of Buyer which cannot be refunded. 
ld. at 723. 
41. ld. 
42. ld. at 723-25. 
43. ld. at 724-25. 
44. ld. at 725 (citing Margaret H. Wayne Trust v. Lipsky, 846 P.2d 904, 908-09 (Idaho 
1993)). 
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ed damages clause with a reservation of other remedies for both the buyer 
and the seller. 45 Although the supreme court in Lipsky found that the 
seller had the right to specific performance because of the reservation, it 
stated that "[t]his is not to say, however, that an agreement for the 
purchase of real property may not be clearly drafted so as to limit the 
seller's remedy to retaining the earnest money deposit as liquidated 
damages. "46 The Doyle court did not explain the significance of the 
Lipsky case. It only noted that both the buyer and the seller in Lipsky had 
a reservation of "other remedies" in the default clause,47 which implicit-
ly included the right of specific performance. 
Additionally, the supreme court ignored significant differences 
between the two cases. In contrast to the earnest contract in Lipsky, the 
earnest money contract in Doyle expressly reserved "other rights" to the 
seller but not to the buyers. 48 Therefore, the court held that the buyers 
were not entitled to any rights other than those expressed in the default 
clause; specifically, the buyers were limited to the return of their earnest 
money.49 Thus, the Doyle court's holding implied that the earnest 
money contract was so clearly drafted that it limited the buyer to the 
remedies expressed in the contract. 50 Implicitly, the supreme court 
declared that if a party does not reserve "other rights" in the contract, a 
party is limited to those remedies expressed in the contract. 
III. ANALYSIS OF THE COURT'S OPINION 
On the surface, the court's conclusion that the buyer is not entitled 
to specific performance appears reasonable. However, upon careful 
examination it is apparent that the court skipped some fundamental steps 
of analysis and ignored several basic rules of interpreting contracts. This 
note focuses on four weaknesses in the Doyle opinion: (1) the lack of 
authority and flawed reasoning; (2) contract interpretation in favor of the 
drafter; (3) the court's failure to interpret the contract according to form 
contract rules; and (4) the inequity resulting from the opinion. The court 
could have arrived at a different conclusion by correctly dealing with any 
of these four factors. Taken together, these weaknesses in the Doyle 
opinion clearly indicate that the court reached the wrong result. 
45. Lipsky, 846 P.2d at 908-09. 
46. ld. at 909; see also Doyle, 872 P.2d at 725. 
47. Doyle, 872 P.2d at 725. 
48. See id. at 723. 
49. ld. at 725. 
50. See id. at 724-25. 
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A. Lack of Authority and Reasoning Flaws in the Doyle Opinion 
1. Insufficient authority to support its holding 
The only authority cited by the supreme court to support its denial 
of the buyers' request for specific performance is Margaret H. Wayne 
Trust v. Lipsky. 51 Lipsky stated in dicta that a purchase agreement may 
be clearly drafted so as to limit the seller's remedy to the liquidated 
damages. 52 However, a few key points distinguish Lipsky from Doyle. 
First, Lipsky actually held that the liquidated damages clause or default 
clause did not limit the seller's remedies, which is the opposite holding 
of the Doyle opinion. 53 Second, Lipsky focused on the seller's remedies, 
whereas Doyle focused on the buyer's remedies. 54 This is significant 
because the buyer of the land has a stronger argument for specific 
performance than the seller since land is unique. 55 Additionally, in 
Doyle the buyers were the nondrafters56 while in Lipsky the seller 
drafted the agreement. 57 Third, the dicta that the court relied upon in 
Lipsky requires a limitation of remedies to be clearly drafted in the agree-
ment. 58 When applying the clearly-drafted requirement to the facts in 
Doyle, it is doubtful whether failing to reserve "other rights" for one 
party in a nonnegotiated clause passes the clearly-drafted test. Fourth, 
Lipsky creates a presumption that a party has a choice of remedies unless 
there is evidence to the contrary. This presumption is found in the Lipsky 
court's citation of Professor Dobbs' treatise on damages: 
The presence of a liquidated damages provision does not automati-
cally prevent the vendor from claiming his actual damages, and in the 
absence of any indication to the contrary, it probably should be assumed 
that the vendor is free to claim liquidated or actual damages, at his 
option. 59 
51. ld. at 725 (citing Margaret H. Wayne Trust v. Lipsky, 846 P.2d 904 (Idaho 1993)). 
52. ld.; cf ROGER A. CUNNINGHAM Er AL., THE LAW OF PROPERTY, § 10.5 (1984) 
("[A] liquidated damages clause may be construed to exclude other remedies such as specific 
performance; likewise, a clause in the contract may expressly deny specific performance.") 
53. Lipsky, 846 P.2d at 904. 
54. See infra note 120 and accompanying text (discussing the difference between the 
buyer's and seller's right to specific performance). 
55. See infra note 120. 
56. See infra part III.B. 
57. Lipsky, 846 P.2d at 906. The seller in Lipsky was the drafting party because her 
form contract was used. ld.; see infra part III. C. 
58. Doyle, 872 P.2d at 725; Lipsky, 846 P.2d at 909. 
59. Lipsky, 846 P.2d at 909 (citing DAN B. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF 
REMEDIES § 12.11 (2d ed. 1993)) (emphasis added). 
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Thus, rather than supporting the Doyle opinion, Lipsky's reference to 
Professor Dobbs sets up a rebuttable presumption for the Doyle court to 
overcome. Apparently, the Doyle court believed evidence existed in the 
default clause to limit the buyers' remedies. However, neither the Lipsky 
court nor the Doyle court ever directly addressed whether failure to 
reserve remedies for only one party, the nondrafting buyers in the Doyle 
case, is sufficient to overcome the Dobbs presumption. 
In summary, only dicta in Lipsky supports the Doyle court's 
conclusion. The facts are easily distinguishable, and the clearly-drafted 
standard is only supported by the buyer's silence. Furthermore, Lipsky 
presumes that rights are not waived. This presumption actually supports 
the buyers' position, which would entitle them to specific performance. 
2. Using the wrong standard of review and overlooking factual 
ambiguities 
The court made another mistake in determining the standard of 
review. The court held, without any analysis, that the contract was not 
subject to any reasonably conflicting interpretations; thus it could 
interpret the contract as a matter of law under the standard of free 
review. 60 However, when concluding that the contract was not subject 
to reasonably conflicting interpretations, the court never considered 
alternative interpretations of the default clause. The absence of such 
discussion and the court's conclusory analysis cause one to wonder if any 
consideration was given to alternative interpretations. 
The contract was silent as to whether the buyers had any remedies 
in addition to the return of their earnest money. This silence could have 
been interpreted in at least three different ways: (1) the silence clearly 
indicated that the parties did not intend specific performance as buyers' 
remedy, (2) the silence created ambiguity, or (3) the silence clearly did 
not state a waiver of the buyers right to specific performance. 
The court's interpretation was that the contract's silence concerning 
remedies clearly indicated that the parties did not intend specific perfor-
mance as a remedy for the buyers. 61 The buyers were therefore limited 
to the return of their earnest money because that was the only remedy 
stated in the default clause. 62 
60. Under the free review standard, the supreme court could review the trial court record 
and contract de novo. See Tyler, supra note 38 (stating that free review and de novo review 
are the same standard). 
61. Doyle, 872 P.2d at 724-25. 
62. ld. 
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The court could have found that the contract's silence created 
ambiguity as to whether the buyers gave up their right to specific perfor-
mance. Since this was a form contract, the parties neither considered nor 
negotiated the terms of the default clause so one must consider the 
parties' intent. 63 The parties' intent is a factual question, requiring 
greater deference to the trial court's decision. 64 Additionally, as a 
factual question, the parties' intent would not be subject to free re-
view.65 
The court might also have found that, in light of the contract's 
silence on buyers' remedies, the contract did not clearly state a waiver of 
the buyers right to specific performance. 66 Because the contract did not 
clearly state that the buyers gave up their right to specific performance, 
they are still entitled to that remedy. 67 No language in the earnest 
money's default clause nor any extrinsic evidence indicated that the 
buyers intended to waive other remedies. The liquidation clause could 
have been a floor for damages rather than a ceiling as the court inter-
preted it. 68 Thus, by interpreting the contract as a matter of law under 
the free review standard, the court could have easily found that the 
buyers were entitled to specific performance. 
The important point is not which interpretation above is correct, but 
rather that these three viable, conflicting interpretations create a factual 
issue about intent that precludes free review. 69 Since the Doyle opinion 
only mentions the first alternative, whether the other interpretations were 
even considered is uncertain. These other reasonable interpretations 
created an issue of fact, which could only be resolved by looking at the 
parties' intent. Because the parties' intent is a factual question, 70 the 
supreme court could have only overturned the trial court's decision71 if 
the decision was clearly erroneous.72 Under the higher standard of 
clearly erroneous, the Doyle court would have been obligated to uphold 
63. See infra part III.C. 
64. Rutter v. McLaughlin, 612 P.2d 135, 136 (Idaho 1980). 
65. See Doyle, 872 P.2d at 724. 
66. This interpretation is opposite of that used by the Doyle court. 
67. See discussion of waivers infra part III.A.3. 
68. See DOBBS, supra note 59 § 12.9(5). 
69. See DeLancey v. DeLancey, 714 P.2d 32, 34 (Idaho 1986); Rutterv. McLaughlin, 
612 P.2d 135, 136 (Idaho 1980). 
70. Ada County Assessor v. Taylor, 861 P.2d 1215, 1218-19 (Idaho 1993); Hilt v. 
Draper, 836 P.2d 558, 563 (Idaho. Ct. App. 1992). 
71. The trial court held that there was insufficient evidence to support the claim that the 
liquidated damages clause was intended to be the buyers' exclusive remedy. Doyle v. Ortega, 
872 P.2d 721, 723 (Idaho 1994). 
72. Rutter, 612 P.2d at 136. 
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the trial court's decision,73 which granted specific performance of the 
contract. Thus, by overlooking other reasonable, conflicting interpreta-
tions, the supreme court used the wrong standard of review to reach the 
wrong result. 
3. Inconsistency with the waiver of rights 
The court's holding is inconsistent with the equitable doctrine of 
waiver in three ways. First, a waiver is ordinarily a question of fact that 
the trier of fact decides. 74 Second, there was no expressed waiver of 
right and the high standard for an implied waiver was not met. Third, 
a person with unclean hands cannot ask for an equitable remedy such as 
a waiver. 
First, using the free review standard for a waiver is erroneous since 
"the existence of [a] waiver ordinarily is a question of fact, and if there 
is any substantial evidence in the record to support a waiver, it is for the 
trier of fact to determine whether the evidence establishes such a 
waiver. "75 In trying to overcome the trial court's factual finding, the 
supreme court erroneously disregarded the findings of the trial court, the 
fact finder, 76 and interpreted a factual issue as a matter of law. 
Although the court could argue that interpreting an unambiguous contract 
was a matter of law, 77 the existence of a waiver of remedies, based on 
the buyers' omission, was a question of fact. 
Second, the Doyle opinion did not present evidence to support an 
expressed or implied waiver of the buyers' equitable right to specific 
performance. The court in Doyle inferred that since the seller reserved 
rights other than the liquidated damages clause and the buyer did not, the 
buyer was not entitled to any other remedy. This reasoning goes against 
the general rule that a waiver of rights requires an "intentional relinquish-
ment of a known right. "78 The opinion cited no expressions by the 
73. The supreme court will uphold a trial court's decision as long as there is substantial 
competent evidence to support that decision. Doyle, 872 P.2d at 724. The trial court claimed 
there was insufficient evidence to support the seller's claim that returning the buyers' earnest 
money was the exclusive remedy. /d. Thus, the supreme court could only reverse the trial 
court's factual finding by showing in the record that the parties intended to make the return of 
the buyers' earnest money the exclusive remedy. Since the facts do not warrant such a finding, 
the supreme court had no basis to overturn the trial court. 
74. Medical Services Group v. Boise Lodge No. 310, Benevolent and Protective Order 
of Elks, 878 P.2d 789, 793 (Idaho Ct. App. 1994). 
75. /d. 
76. Doyle, 872 P.2d at 723-25. 
77. /d. at 724. 
78. Margaret H. Wayne Trust v. Lipsky, 846 P.2d 904, 907 (Idaho 1993); see also 
BrandS. Corp. v. King, 639 P.2d 429, 432 (Idaho 1981); DOBBS, supra note 59 § 2.3(5) 
("Waiver is an intentional, voluntary, and understanding relinquishment of a known right."). 
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Doyles indicating they intended to relinquish or waive their right to 
specific performance. 
In Lipsky, the court held that "[t]o establish a waiver, the intention 
to waive must clearly appear. "79 A waiver was not clearly apparent in 
the Doyles' contract. Lipsky also stated that a "[w]aiver will not be 
inferred except from a clear and unequivocal act manifesting an intent to 
waive or from conduct amounting to estoppel. "80 Moreover, Lipsky 
gave the task of weighing conflicting evidence in order to determine the 
existence of a waiver to the trial court. 81 Further, the trial court's 
findings should not be overturned on appeal unless there is a lack of 
substantial and competent evidence to support its findings. 82 
Without an expressed waiver, the supreme court needed to justify its 
position through an implied waiver. Generally, an "implied waiver 
consists of two elements: (1) reliance by the party seeking to assert a 
waiver; and (2) direct and unequivocal conduct indicating a waiver. "83 
However, the facts do not sustain either prong of this test. Although 
implied waiver is possible under Idaho law, proving it requires a high 
standard of proof with the burden of proof on the party asserting the 
waiver. 
The problem for the seller in Doyle is that the evidence is insufficient 
to meet the burden of proof for an implied waiver. 84 No facts establish 
direct or unequivocal conduct by the Doyles indicating they intended to 
give up their right to specific performance. Nor was there evidence that 
Ortega, the seller, relied on the limitation of the buyers' remedy in the 
default clause of the contract. The bottom line is that Ortega simply did 
not meet the test for an implied waiver. Since the seller did not meet the 
threshold test for an implied waiver and since the contract did not contain 
an express waiver, the Doyles should have been entitled to specific 
performance. 
79. Lipsky, 846 P.2d at 907. See Riverside Development Co. v. Ritchie, 650 P.2d 657, 
662 (Idaho 1982). 
80. Lipsky, 846 P. 2d at 907; Soloaga v. Bannock County, 809 P. 2d 1157, 1161 (Idaho 
Ct. App. 1990); Jones v. Maestas, 696 P.2d 920, 922 (Idaho Ct. App. 1985). 
81. Lipsky, 846 P.2d at 907. 
82. See id. at 907-08; Price v. Aztec Limited, Inc., 701 P.2d 294, 298 (Idaho Ct. App. 
1985); see also IDAHO R. Civ. P. 52(a) (1994) (indicating that a finding of facts shall not be 
set aside unless clearly erroneous). 
83. Idaho Migrant Council, Inc. v. Northwestern Mutual Life Ins. Co., 718 P.2d 1242, 
1244 (Idaho Ct. App. 1986). 
84. This may be why the trial court held there was insufficient evidence to prove that the 
buyers intended to give up their right to specific performance. See Doyle, 872 P.2d at 723. 
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Third, a person with unclean hands cannot seek a remedy in 
equity. 85 Waiver is an equitable doctrine. 86 As an equitable remedy, 
a waiver should not be granted haphazardly, especially in the form 
contract setting to the breaching party. In Doyle, the seller, who 
breached the contract, essentially asked the court to interpret the buyers' 
silence as a waiver of rights. 87 Contrary to the clean hands doctrine, the 
court waived the buyers' rights to specific performance by granting equity 
to the breaching party. 88 
4. Returning the buyers' earnest money is not inconsistent with 
specific performance 
Returning the buyers' earnest money is not inconsistent with specific 
performance as the supreme court claimed. Presumably, if the buyers 
were entitled to both specific performance and return of their earnest 
money, the court felt the buyers would be unjustly enriched. The default 
clause stated that if the seller defaulted, "the earnest money shall be 
returned to the buyer. "89 However, even if the buyers were entitled to 
specific performance and return of their earnest money, they would not 
be unjustly enriched. The following hypothetical situation illustrates this 
point: 
Assume the terms of the contract are as follows (1) earnest money 
paid is $1,000, (2) sale price of the property is $30,000, and (3) other 
costs are $500 and are the responsibility of the buyer to pay. Other costs 
could be paid out of the earnest money during the final closing settle-
ment. 
If the buyers' remedy is limited to specific performance of the 
contract, they are required to pay the seller $29,500 as stipulated by the 
contract. The total cost of the property is $30,500 ($30,000 sale price 
plus $500 for other costs). After subtracting the credit for the earnest 
money, the amount owed is $29,500. Of the $1,000 of the earnest 
money, $500 will be applied to the downpayment and the other $500 will 
be used to pay for the buyers' other costs. The gross cost to the buyers 
is $30,500 and the net proceeds to the sellers is $30,000. 
85. Hoopes v. Hoopes, 861 P.2d 88, 92 (Idaho Ct. App. 1993) ("[H]e who comes in 
equity must come with clean hands," and a party can be denied relief in an equity court if "his 
conduct has been inequitable, unfair and dishonest, or fraudulent."). However, the clean hands 
doctrine is not a straight jacket for a court. /d. The court should focus on conduct not 
motives. ld. 
86. See Idaho Migrant Council, 718 P.2d at 1244. 
87. See Doyle, 872 P.2d at 722-25. 
88. ld. 
89. ld. at 723 (emphasis added) (quoting the earnest money contract between the Doyles 
and Ortega). 
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If the buyers were entitled to both the return of their earnest money 
under the default clause and specific performance, the result is the same 
as if the buyers were limited to specific performance. Assuming that all 
closing costs have already been paid out of the earnest money, the seller 
will· have to return the $500 of remaining earnest money and give the 
buyer $500 out of his own pocket, which was taken from the earnest 
money to cover other costs. When the contract is specifically enforced, 
the buyer will have to pay the full price for the property, $30,000. The 
buyers, under the terms of the contract, will also have to pay the other 
costs of $500. However, since the seller has already paid this $500, the 
seller would be entitled to reimbursement. The seller will have paid $500 
out-of-pocket and then will have been reimbursed. Again, the gross cost 
to the buyers is $30,500 and the net proceeds to sellers is $30,000. This 
illustration demonstrates that the default clause remedy and specific 
performance are not inconsistent with each other since the buyer was not 
unjustly enriched and both transactions lead to the same result. 
B. Contract Interpretation in Favor of the Drafter 
Besides the reasoning errors and lack of authority, the Doyle opinion 
violated a basic rule of contract construction by interpreting the earnest 
money contract in favor of the drafter. This is contrary to the longstand-
ing rule that contracts are to be interpreted against the drafter. 90 In 
Doyle, the first form was prepared by the buyers, but this was rejected 
by the seller. 91 The seller then had his realtor draw up a new con-
tract, 92 a counteroffer. 93 This new offer was accepted by the buy-
ers.94 To clarify confusion about the contract terms,95 the buyers' 
broker drew up an addendum to the seller's contract to summarize all the 
90. See USA Fertilizer, Inc. v. Idaho First National Bank, 815 P.2d 469,472 (Idaho Ct. 
App. 1991); Luzar v. Western Surety Co., 692 P.2d 337, 341 (Idaho 1984); see also 
REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 206 (1979) ("In choosing among the reasonable 
meanings of a promise or agreement or a term thereof, that meaning is generally preferred 
which operates against the party who supplies the words or from whom a writing otherwise 
proceeds.") (emphasis added); CUNNINGHAM, supra note 52, § 10.4 ("Courts often enforce 
forfeiture-of-deposit clauses only grudgingly. Since they are obviously designed to protect the 
vendor, they are construed against him in cases of ambiguity."). 
91. Doyle, 872 P.2d at 722. 
92. See id. 
93. See REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 39 (1979). Since the seller's realtor 
used a standardized form, drawing up the contract consisted of filling in the spaces reserved 
for negotiable terms. The liquidation clause was just boilerplate on the reverse side of the 
contract. See Doyles' Earnest Money Contract, supra note 5. 
94. See Doyle, 872 P.2d at 722. 
95. None of the clarification related to default clause, id., which was in small print on 
the reverse side of the seller's form. See Doyles' Earnest Money Contract, supra note 5. The 
negotiation and clarification related to terms on the front side of the form. 
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changes. 96 However, the important point is that the seller's earnest 
money contract form was used, and the court interpreted the contract in 
the seller's favor. 
Arguably, the court could opine that this rule of contract construction 
only applies if the contract is subject to reasonably conflicting interpreta-
tions.97 Since the court held that the contract was not ambiguous,98 the 
rule of interpreting a contract in favor of the nondrafter was a moot 
issue. 
However, in deciding whether the contract is ambiguous, the court 
gave very little weight to the possibility that the contract might be subject 
to reasonably conflicting interpretations. 99 As discussed above, 100 the 
contract was subject to reasonably conflicting interpretations and thus 
should have been considered ambiguous. When such an ambiguity exists, 
the interpretation should favor the nondrafting party, which in this case 
was the buyer. 101 
C. Failure to Conform to Form Contract Rules 
From the court's opinion, it appears that the court treated the default 
clause as if it were a negotiated part of the contract; however, this 
interpretation is not supported by the facts. 102 Rather, the default 
clause was just boilerplate language. 103 
It is likely that neither party fully understood the extent of their 
rights under the default clause. The default clause in Doyle was a 
standard RE 21 earnest money contract, a form contract prepared by the 
realty community. 104 As with all liquidated damages clauses, the 
96. Doyle, 872 P.2d at 722-23. 
97. See Suchan v. Suchan, 741 P.2d 1289, 1295 (Idaho 1987); USA Fertilizer Inc. v. 
First Nat') Bank, 815 P.2d 469 (Idaho Ct. App. 1991). 
98. Doyle, 872 P.2d at 724. 
99. See supra Part III.A.2. 
100. /d. 
101. See USA Fertilizer, 815 P.2d at 472; Luzar v. Western Surety Co., 692 P.2d 337, 
341 (Idaho !984); See also REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 206 (1979) ("In 
choosing among the reasonable meanings of a promise or agreement or a renn thereof, that 
meaning is generally preferred which operates against the party who supplies the words or from 
whom a writing otherwise proceeds.") (emphasis added); CUNNINGHAM, supra note 52, § 10.4 
("Courts often enforce forfeiture-of-deposit clauses only grudgingly. Since they are obviously 
designed to protect the vendor, they are construed against him in cases of ambiguity."). 
102. See Doyle, 872 P.2d at 722-24. 
103. See, e.g., Margaret H. Wayne Trust v. Lipsky, 846 P.2d 904, 906 (Idaho 1993) 
(earnest money contract was on "a standard printed real estate purchase and sales agreement" 
prepared by the seller); earnest money contracts listed in supra note 5. 
104. See Doyles' Earnest Money Contract, supra note 5. All three of earnest money 
contracts listed in supra note 5 have the default clause printed in small print on the reverse side 
of the contract with no space provided for modification. 
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weight given to them should be based on how large a part they played in 
the negotiation process. 105 The facts do not suggest that the parties 
even read or considered the clauses in their negotiations. 106 
The Doyle earnest money contract illustrates the difficulty of 
negotiating remedies in a form contract setting. The important negotiable 
factors are found on the front side of a standardized carbon copy 
form. 107 Such terms include the price and identify which party will pay 
the various costs associated with the transaction. 108 When a price is 
marked on the standard form, it is carbon copied to the broker's and 
buyer's copies. However, the default clause is on the reverse side of the 
form. 109 Any changes to the default clause cannot be carbon copied to 
other copies of the agreement. 110 In other words, it would take a 
sophisticated buyer making an extra effort in order to modify the default 
clause. Additionally, the standard forms were prepared by the realty 
community, 111 which is more significantly influenced by sellers and 
brokers than by buyers. 112 
The general rule regarding form contracts is that terms are consid-
ered part of an integrated agreement unless the party drafting the contract 
(the seller) has reason to believe that the other party (the buyer) would 
not have consented to the terms. 113 The issue the court should have 
addressed is whether the buyers would have agreed to the default clause 
if they knew they were not entitled to specific performance. This 
question was not addressed by the court and cannot be answered from the 
facts in the opinion. 
105. See Jeffrey B. Coopersmith, Refocusing Liquidated Damages Law for Real Estate 
Contracts: Returning to the Historical Roots of the Penalty Doctrine, 39 EMoRY L.J. 267, 298 
(1990); cf Elizabeth Warren, Formal and Operative Rules Under Common Law and Code, 30 
U.C.L.A. L. REv. 898, 916 (1983) (underliquidated damages clause present opportunity for 
abuse partially because courts assume that they have been fairly negotiated). 
106. See Doyle, 872 P.2d at 722-24. 
107. See Doyles' Earnest Money Contract, supra note 5. 
108. Jd. 
109. See supra note 5 and accompanying text (citing to a copy of the earnest money 




112. This explains why the earnest money was split equally between the broker and seller 
if the buyer defaulted as well as why retention of the earnest money did "not constitute a 
waiver of any other rights or remedies" for the seller or broker. Doyle, 872 P.2d at 723. 
113. See REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211 (1979). 
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D. Inequity Resulting From the Doyle Opinion 
1. Historical background of specific performance 
Equitable remedies like specific performance were developed to grant 
relief for the sometimes harsh and inadequate results of legal reme-
dies.114 For example, remedies at law could only provide damages 
(monetary compensation) when a party breached a contract, but could not 
demand performance under the contract. 115 However, a court of equity 
could order specific performance if the remedy at law (damages) was 
inadequate. 116 Although Idaho, like many other states, has abolished 
the distinction between courts of equity and courts at law, 117 many of 
the rules associated with courts of equity and courts at law still apply. 
For example, a party is not entitled to an equitable remedy for breach of 
contract in Idaho unless the remedy at law is inadequate. 118 In contract 
settings, damages often suffice since a party may be able to obtain 
substitute performance. This is particularly true if the contract is for the 
sale of goods. However, if the contract involves the sale of land, 
damages may not be adequate because each parcel of land is thought to 
be unique in character.119 Thus, the nonbreaching party of a contract 
to sell land is usually entitled to specific performance because of the 
unique character of the land. 120 
114. See generally CUNNINGHAM, supra note 52, §10.5. 
115. Suchan v. Rutherford, 410 P.2d 434, 436-438, 441 (Idaho 1966). 
116. /d.; see also JOHN D. CALAMARI&JOSEPH M. PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACfS, 
§ 16-2 (1987) ("[E]very interest in land was unique. Consequently, the remedy of damages 
for breach of a contract to convey an interest in land was deemed inadequate."); CUNNINGHAM, 
supra note 52, §I 0.5 ("[S]pecific performance should be ordered only when the remedy at law 
is inadequate .... [e]ach parcel of land is unique .... Hence, damages are inadequate per 
se."). 
117. IDAHO CONST. art. 5, § I ("The distinctions between actions at law and suits in 
equity, and the forms of all such actions and suits, are hereby prohibited; and there shall be 
in this state but one form of action for the enforcement or protection of private rights or the 
redress of private wrongs, which shall be denominated a civil action."); see Village of Peck 
v. Denison, 450 P.2d 310, 316 (Idaho 1969) (McFadden, J., concurring in part and dissenting 
in part). 
118. See Holscher v. James, 860 P.2d 646, 650 (ldalto !993); CUNNINGHAM, supra note 
52, §10.5 ( "[S]pecific performance should be ordered only when the remedy at law is 
inadequate"). 
119. See Hancock v. Dusenberry, 715 P.2d 360, 365 (Idaho Ct. App. 1986); 
CUNNINGHAM, supra note 52, §10.5 ("[E]ach parcel of land is unique .... Hence, damages 
are inadequate per se. "). 
120. It is thought that substitute performance or damages are inadequate since no two 
pieces of land are alike. See Suchan v. Rutherford, 410 P.2d 434, 438-39 (Idaho 1966). Thus, 
specific performance may be the only way to compensate the nonbreaching party in a contact 
for the sale of land. This philosophy is probably more true for the buyer than the seller. See 
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2. Fundamental unfairness in the result 
Although the contract between the Doyles and Ortega probably did 
not reach the level of being unconscionable, 121 under the court's 
interpretation of the contract, the remedies available to the buyer are 
significantly reduced in comparison to those available to the seller. At 
one time the courts required a mutuality of remedies. 122 Although a 
mutuality of remedies is no longer required, 123 it is still a factor when 
accompanied by other reasons. 124 Given all the other reasons discussed 
above, 125 the court should have considered the disparity in remedies 
resulting from its interpretation. 
The result of the Doyle opinion is that the seller is entitled to 
liquidated damages, but is not precluded from other damages if the buyer 
breaches. This means the seller could also argue for "reliance damages," 
"restitution damages," or "expectation damages. "126 In contrast, the 
buyers are limited to liquidated damages, which puts them in the same 
position as if they had never made the contract. Essentially, the court's 
holding precludes them from their bargained-for expectations. 
To better understand the difference between the buyers' and the 
seller's positions, consider the following hypothetical based on the court's 
interpretation of the default clause at issue in Doyle: 
The purchase price is $30,000, and the buyer puts down earnest 
money of $1,000. However, after the earnest money contract is signed 
by both parties, the land decreases in value to $20,000. The buyer 
breaches hoping only to lose only the earnest money invested. 
CUNNINGHAM, supra note 52, § 10.5. If the seller breaches, then the buyer loses the 
opportunity to buy that particular parcel with its unique characteristics. Money damages may 
allow the buyer to purchase another parcel of land, but the parcel will be different in some 
respects. ld. 
Conversely, if the buyer breaches, the seller may also be entitled to specific performance. 
However, the equitable importance may not be as strong. See id. If the seller receives money 
damages for differences between the market price and out-of-pocket expenses associated with 
finding and selling to a new buyer, then the non-breaching seller has been made whole without 
the need for specific performance. Thus, the remedy at law is an adequate form of damages. 
The unique character of the land is not as important to the seller since his or her interest is in 
the price not the land itself. The price does not have unique characteristics like the parcel of 
land. Nevertheless, courts continue to grant sellers specific performance. See id; see also 
Margaret H. Wayne Trust v. Lipsky, 846 P.2d 904, 908-09 (Idaho 1993). 
121. See generally Smith v. Idaho State University, 760 P.2d 19, 23-24 (Idaho 1988) 
(applying the unconscionability doctrine). 
122. Suchan, 410 P.2d at 439-40. 
123. See id.; CALAMARI, supra note 116, § 16-6; CUNNINGHAM, supra note 52, § 10.5. 
124. Suchan, 410 P.2d at 439. 
125. See supra Part III.A, B, C. 
126. See REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 344 (1979). 
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Under such a scenario, the $1,000 would be applied first to certain 
costs associated with the transaction, and then would be split evenly 
between the broker and the seller. 127 Assuming no costs, the seller 
would get $500, one-half of the earnest money. Additionally, the seller 
could bring an action for the other $9,500 for the lost benefit of his 
bargain, expectation damages. Alternatively, the seller could seek 
specific performance, again expectation damages. 
Conversely, if the seller breaches the contract, the buyers have the 
right to have the full amount of their earnest money returned. If some 
of the earnest money has been applied toward costs related to the 
transaction, the seller is required to make up the ditference. 128 Essen-
tially, the buyers are put back in the same position as if the deal had 
never been made and are denied the benefit of their bargain. If the 
property had increased in price to $45,000, the buyers would not get 
damages for the $15,000 increase but would simply have their $1,000 of 
earnest money returned. 
The disparity of remedies created under the Doyle opinion allows the 
seller to enforce the contract if property values decline or default and sell 
the property for a higher price if property values rise. Essentially, the 
contract allows the seller to speculate while binding the buyer to the 
contract. This result could be equitable if the parties had intended to be 
bound by such a bargain, but the result should not stem from one party's 
silence. 
3. Other issues related to liquidated damages clauses 
In reaching its decision, the court seemed to have forgotten some 
basic reasons for liquidated damage clauses. Damages for breaches are 
often difficult to measure and prove, so parties create liquidated damages 
clauses to measure what they expect the damages to be. 129 Courts have 
held such clauses unenforceable if they are found to be a penalty or if 
they are too far removed from the actual damages. 130 
Public policy reasons for upholding liquidated damage clauses do not 
apply to specific performance for two reasons. First, there is no need to 
measure the damages since specific performance is literally the enforce-
127. See discussion of default clause supra part II. B. 
128. !d. 
129. See ULTA § 2-516 (1975). This section also states that "[a] party entitled to recover 
under a valid liquidated-damages clause has no other remedy for any breach to which the 
liquidated-damages clause applies unless other remedies are expressly reserved in the contract" 
!d. § 2-516(b ). However, this position depends upon the clause being an exclusive liquidation 
clause, which is dependant upon the parties negotiations and expressions. See DOBBS, supra 
note 59, § 12.9(5). 
130. See DOBBS, supra note 59, § 12.9(5). 
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ment of the parties' actual bargain. Other than incidental costs or time 
delays associated with enforcing the contract, specific performance equals 
actual damages. For example, if the land value increases from $30,000 
to $45,000 and the seller breaches, an action for damages could be 
brought for $15,000. If specific performance is the remedy, then the 
buyer would get a parcel of land worth $45,000 for the cost $30,000. 
Both actions yield the same result. Second, specific performance cannot 
be a penalty. Penalties in liquidated damage clauses occur when the 
liquidated damages unreasonably exceed the actual damages. Specific 
performance can not exceed the actual damages, so it can never be a 
penalty. However, in spite of these theoretical inconsistencies, a valid 
liquidated damage clause can be the exclusive remedy. 131 
Other questions related to interpreting a liquidated damage clause 
also arise. For example, was the default clause meant to be a floor or 
ceiling?132 The Doyle court interpreted the buyers' and seller's liquidat-
ed damage clauses differently. The seller's clause is interpreted to be a 
floor while the buyers' clause is interpreted to be a ceiling. Clearly, a 
court can find that a liquidated damages clause is a floor for one party 
and a ceiling for another party as long as the parties explicitly agree to 
such remedies in the contract. 133 However, the issue in Doyle is 
whether the court should have interpreted the liquidated damages clause 
as a ceiling when the parties did not negotiate the clause, and the parties' 
intent is based on omissions rather than on explicit language. If a court 
is allowed to interpret a party's omissions as well as terms not negotiated 
during the bargaining process as waivers of rights, the contractual 
bargaining process will dramatically change. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The clearly erroneous standard of review should have been used 
rather than free review. The court based its standard of review on the 
contract being unambiguous. However, the court had to stretch when it 
declared, in effect, that a form contract, which does not include an 
expressed reservation of specific performance, is an unambiguous 
intention by that party to waive those rights. Furthermore, the opinion 
shows no indication that other reasonable interpretations were considered. 
For example, the liquidated damages clause could have been a floor 
rather than a ceiling. Given the ambiguities in Doyle, the court should 
have given greater deference to the trial court's findings, changed its 
131. See ULTA § 2-516 (b) (1975); DOBBS, supra note 59, § 12.9(5). 
132. DOBBS, supra note 59, § 12.9(5). 
133. ld. 
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standard of review to clearly erroneous, or remanded the case for further 
inquiry. 
The Doyle court's legal authority and analysis is insufficient to 
support its opinion. To find a waiver of specific performance, the court 
relied on dicta in Margaret H. Wayne Trust v. Lipsky,134 which would 
allow a waiver if the contract was clearly drafted. Whether the contract 
was clearly drafted is highly debatable. Moreover, the court ignores 
various facts that distinguish Lipsky from Doyle, including the Lipsky 
opinion's implied waiver analysis. Furthermore, the court's claim that 
returning the earnest money and specific performance are inconsistent 
remedies is inaccurate since the buyers are not unjustly enriched and the 
seller's damages are not increased. 
Finally, the public policies underlying the court's opinion are 
counter-intuitive and counter-productive. Generally, home buyers should 
not be required to list their rights in order to preserve them. Denying 
buyers the exchange they bargained for because of omissions on a 
standardized form prepared by the seller is nothing short of inequity, 
especially when the sellers' rights are preserved. Specific performance 
was created to provide equity, yet the court's refusal to allow specific 
performance in this case created inequity. 
Robert L. Phillips 
134. 846 P.2d 904 (Idaho 1993). 
